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The proper role of government has been a subject of significant political debate throughout U.S. history, but especially 
in the last two years since the emergence of the 
libertarian Tea Party organization. Nonetheless, 
most agree that government has certain core 
responsibilities, such as defending citizens’ life and 
property, maintaining territorial sovereignty, and 
dealing with emergent public policy crises, such as 
environmental disasters or epidemics. One of the 
most important roles of government, and indeed 
one of the motivations for the original creation of 
complex governance structures, is the mitigation 
and management of social conflict short of vio-
lence: complex problem solving. 
   Different forms of government perform this 
conflict-mitigation function, as well as the other 
core functions of governance, in different ways. 
Autocracies, for example, mitigate social conflict 
by minimizing social interaction, while totalitar-
ian states mitigate social conflict by attempting to 
exert absolute control over every aspect of social 
interaction. Democracies, in contrast, function 
by harnessing social interaction. Where autocra-
cies maintain order at the expense of liberty and 
free interaction, democracies are designed with an 
underlying leap of faith, that people can interact 
in politically-significant ways without killing one 
another, inciting riots, or otherwise destabiliz-
ing society. The democratic strategy is necessarily 
more complicated, as it involves striking a delicate 
balance between liberty and regulation: people 
must be free to interact and communicate, but 
this interaction must be structured and regulated; 
order must be maintained and safety preserved, 
while at the same time the state requires structural 
mechanisms (e.g., elections, sub-national gover-
nance systems, public question and answer sessions, 
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deliberative forums) to translate interaction and 
communication in the populace into actionable 
information about public policy problems and 
preferences. Democracy manages society on the 
knife’s edge, balancing between chaos and order, 
where a slip in either direction will bring down 
anarchy on the one hand and autocratic backslid-
ing on the other. 
   Democracies, in short, are both complicated 
and complex, but they offer a great deal of poten-
tial. Research by scholars in the fields of public 
administration, economics, and complexity theory 
have demonstrated that organizations that harness 
social complexity tend to make more informed 
decisions and are more adaptable in the face of 
change.  The last century, at least on the surface, 
seems to extend these findings to the performance 
of democracies. Leaving aside for a moment the 
rise of semi-democratic (anocratic) regimes in 
the last thirty years, the twentieth century saw 
democratic regimes survive two world wars and 
the Cold War, while maintaining extraordinary 
economic prowess and continuing to perform 
their core functions domestically. 
   The changes through which our world’s young 
democracies persevered is astounding, in ret-
rospect. When my great-grandfather was born, 
autocracies were the norm and democracy an 
ill-perceived experiment in social engineering, air 
travel was a dream (he emigrated from Canada 
on horseback), and veterans of the U.S. Civil War 
populated small-town parades. By the time of his 
death, I had traveled to Japan in twelve hours’ 
time and watched recorded footage of the moon 
landing on the Internet, and democracy had be-
come the government of a majority of the world’s 
countries and achieved a monopoly on legitimacy 
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in governance. In contrast, how many autocratic 
regimes from the 19th century survived the last 
century’s tumult? 
   While it is impossible to foretell how much 
similar change we will experience in this century, 
so far we are developing quickly indeed – faster 
in many cases that societal norms have been able 
to catch up. Internet and cellular phone usage are 
ubiquitous, with the former now readily accessed 
via the latter. The media is struggling to transition 
into the new digital world, and the mainstream 
television news broadcast has been replaced by 
news entertainment. Instant messaging and email 
have replaced the written letter, and students in-
creasingly seem more comfortable communicating 
online than in person. I recently invited several 
students to dinner, only to find them check-
ing Facebook notifications during the awkward 
pauses endemic to polite conversation. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, our attention span has reduced 
in this new digital age, and where politicians once 
gave speeches for hours on end, including lengthy, 
well-reasoned arguments, in the modern era the 
thirty-second sound-bite, loaded with hyperbole 
and rhetoric, rules the political domain. At the 
same time, we find that Americans are becoming 
less informed and more polarized.
   Unfortunately for government, technology is 
only one aspect in which the world is becoming 
more complex. We face enormous problems in the 
next century, with looming crises due to energy 
consumption and fossil fuel dependence, cli-
mate change, deforestation, water pollution, and 
desertification, among others. We are increasingly 
dependent upon highly complex technology for 
our economic and military strength, and massive, 
grid-debilitating solar flares are expected in the 
next decade. The number of independent states 
in the world has more than quadrupled in the last 
seventy years.  Governments face the same core 
responsibilities as ever, but they do so in an envi-
ronment characterized by extreme and increasing 
levels of complexity, interconnectivity, and inter-
dependence.
   Few would argue that the last one hundred years 
have seen more change, more quickly, than any 
other period in human history. While democracies 
are better situated to adapt to changing environ-
mental conditions, they can only do so if their 
structures and institutions remain flexible. Can 
our democracy survive the modern age? More spe-
cifically, can democratic institutions continue to 
help us solve our increasingly complex problems 
in this age of hyperbole, polarization, and the 
decreased attention span?
   While on the surface these problems may seem 
minor compared to the crises looming on the 
horizon, the first two are particularly worrisome 
for governance. Factionalism, the systemic po-
larization of society into haves and have-nots, 
for- and anti-system groups, decried by James 
Madison in Federalist 51, has been identified and 
confirmed as a leading cause of democratic break-
down and civil war by the U.S. Political Instabil-
ity Task Force.  Most of the young democracies 
in the world will die before age 15, in no small 
part because of the identity politics associated 
with factionalism. Polarization is dangerous to 
democracies, but the replacement of reasoning 
by rhetoric and truth by hyperbole endangers 
them even further, because it reduces potentially-
constructive disagreement into destructive anti-
system goals and language. Like the fairies of Peter 
Pan, when the people lose faith in the system, the 
system begins to die. The U.S. reached this state 
of factionalism in the 1850s and 1860s, leading to 
the ruinous Civil War. We came close again in the 
1960s, when identity politics and polarization led 
to significant violence between state and citizenry. 
Belgium has recently suffered from this transition 
from policy to identity-based politics, having had 
no effective government for the last few years due 
to the failure of its increasingly polarized political 
parties to reach agreement. The survival of our sys-
tem through both the Civil War and the twentieth 
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century speak to the resilience of our institutions. 
Continued survival, however, will depend on con-
tinued flexibility in the face of change, flexibility 
that is undermined by polarization and hyperbole, 
alignment of policy preferences with identity. 
When liberals become communists and conserva-
tives become fascists, the flexibility of the political 
system is eroded. 
   Professor Richman’s position paper inspires 
another question: what happens to democratic 
problem-solving when participants no longer 
agree on the nature of truth, or when leaders use 
lies to advance parochial political agendas? Re-
cently, bold-faced lies have become common in 
our political discourse: Senator Kyl’s “not intend-
ed to be a factual statement” memo is a high-pro-
file example. Democratic deliberation is founded 
on the basis of truth – when hyperbole and lies 
replace evidence and truth as the basis of our dis-
cussion, we make worse policy rather than better 
policy; instead of harnessing social complexity, we 
threaten to unleash the mob.
   In order to continue to mitigate social conflict 
and solve our increasingly complex problems, we 
must seek to make our political system, includ-
ing both structures and participation dynamics, 
more flexible and adaptable, and resist the struc-
tural inertia that bureaucracies develop over time. 
The question facing us is how to develop such 
flexibility. How does the use of referenda affect 
the problem-solving capacity of government? If 
the growing federal government is a sign of such 
inertia, could greater devolution of power to local 
and regional governments improve flexibility? 
Other states, such as Canada or the United King-
dom, are more decentralized than the U.S., and 
seem to do fine. Could a deliberative democratic 
structure serve our needs better? In that case, who 
decides which topics and pieces of evidence can be 
brought to the deliberation table?
   Democracy is no more effective or flexible than 
the institutions that comprise it, and it can last 
no longer than does the faith of its citizens. While 
democracies are more flexible than autocracies due 
to their strategy of harnessing social complexity; 
inertia, polarization, and hyperbole threaten to 
erode our political institutions and our faith in the 
democratic experiment. Can democratic problem-
solving survive the modern era? 
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